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WILLS-HOLOGRAPHIC WILLS AND TESTAMENTARY INTENT-EXTRINSIC
EVIDENCE IS INADMISSIBLE TO PROVE TESTAMENTARY INTENT FOR
HOLOGRAPHIC WILLS LACKING WORDS OF DISPOSITION. Edmundson v.
Estate of Fountain, No. 03-1459, 2004 WL 1475423 (Ark. July 1, 2004).
I. INTRODUCTION
Few civil matters are as controversial as will disputes. These cases of-
ten pit family member against family member for recognition of their claim
to the estate of a deceased loved one. Unlike formal wills in which ceremo-
nial formalities prove the intention of the testator,' when confronted with a
holographic will 2 the survivors of the deceased may question the intent of
the document. One commentator observed that the majority of holographic
wills were forgeries.3 Due to these concerns, holographic wills have great
potential to incite disputes over the deceased's estate. Notwithstanding the
potential for controversy, the holographic will survives as an inexpensive
means for citizens to avoid intestacy. In fact, provisions for holographic
wills are in both the Uniform Probate Code and the Restatement (Third) of
Property.4
This note will explore the controversy over testamentary intent in
holographic wills brought about by the recent Arkansas Supreme Court de-
cision Edmundson v. Estate of Fountain.5 Section II of this note will provide
both the background facts of the case and the reasoning of the Arkansas
Court of Appeals. 6 After that, Section III will explore the historical back-
ground of the law of holographic wills, 7 the early law in Arkansas and the
development of the testamentary intent requirement,' and the development
of Arkansas law regarding the proof of testamentary intent.9 Next, Section
IV will trace the reasoning of the Arkansas Supreme Court's majority' and
1. See generally Emily Sherwin, Clear and Convincing Evidence of Testamentary
Intent: The Search for a Compromise Between Formality and Adjudicative Justice, 34 CONN.
L. REV. 453, 455-56 (2002).
2. A holographic will is an informal will written in the handwriting of the deceased. 1
WILLIAM J. BOWE & DOUGLAS H. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 1.3 (3d ed. 1960).
3. John J. Harris, Genuine or Forged?, 32 CAL. ST. B.J. 658, 660 (1957).
4. See U.P.C § 2-502(b) (1990) (amended 1993); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.2 (1998).
5. No. 03-1459, 2004 WL 1475423 (Ark. July 1, 2004).
6. See infra Sections II and ILA.
7. See infra Section III.A.
8. See infra Section III.B.
9. See infra Sections III.C.1-3.
10. See infra Section IV.A.
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dissenting opinions in Edmundson." Finally, Section V will comment on
the state of the law regarding both admission of extrinsic evidence to prove
testamentary intent' 2 and the substantive facial requirements for a valid
holographic will.13
II. FACTS
Oral W. Fountain was the widowed mother of Kay Edmonston,
14
Wayne Fountain, Shirley Washington, E.W. Fountain, and Nell Harris.' 5
Mrs. Fountain lived alone on a 160-acre cattle farm in Izard County, Arkan-
sas. 16 She raised five children on her farm and continued to keep cattle.
17
Most of Mrs. Fountain's children lived elsewhere, but the youngest daugh-
ter, Kay Edmonston, lived next door to Mrs. Fountain. 18 On April 23, 1998,
Mrs. Fountain died.' 9 Mrs. Fountain's children initially probated the estate
as intestate.23 Three of the Fountain siblings filed to administer the estate.
2'
Kay Edmonston objected to this. 22 Two months after Mrs. Fountain's death,
the administrator-siblings filed a petition to sell Mrs. Fountain's personal
property, and Kay Edmonston again objected.2 3
Sometime between April and May of 1999, approximately one year af-
ter Mrs. Fountain's death and soon after the probate judge's final order to
sell Mrs. Fountain's personal property, Mr. Roger Hall called upon the Ed-
monston household.24 While visiting, Mr. Hall acquired a large roll of up-
holstery that belonged to Chick Edmonston, the husband of Kay Edmon-
11. See infra Sections IV.B and IV.C.
12. See infra Section V.A.
13. See infra Section V.B.
14. There is a c sidserabte amrnutt of coxfusie Qot the spetti g of Mrs. Edmotstct's
name. The Arkansas Court of Appeals misspelled her name as "Edmondston," and the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court spelled her name "Edmundson." The correct spelling of her name is
"Edmonston" as it is on the holographic will written by her mother. See Edmondston v. Es-
tate of Fountain, 84 Ark. App. 231, 240, 137 S.W.3d 415, 420 (2003) for a reproduction of
the will.
15. Appellant's Abstract and Brief at 8, Edmondston v. Estate of Fountain, 84 Ark.




19. Appellee's Supplemental Abstract and Brief at 7, Edmondston v. Estate of Fountain,
84 Ark. App. 231, 137 S.W.3d 415 (2003) (No. CA 02-842).
20. Edmundson v. Estate of Fountain, No. 03-1459, 2004 WL 1475423, at *1 (Ark. July
1,2004).
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ston.25 A few weeks later, Mr. Hall unrolled the upholstery to use as a stair
cover and discovered an envelope inside of the roll.2 6 The envelope con-
tained what seemed to be a handwritten will signed by Oral W. Fountain.27
Mr. Hall informed Mrs. Edmonston about the contents of the enve-
lope.28 Mrs. Edmonston arranged to meet Mr. Hall at a liquor store on the
Izard county line to receive the envelope and contents.29 The purported will
found inside of the envelope read:
Last Will Jan. 1 1997
Kay Edmonston
160 acre farm & contents remaining
37 head of cattle at this time
1972 truck
Wayne Fountain












Kay Edmonston was the beneficiary of nearly all of Mrs. Fountain's
estate. 31 Kay submitted the document to the probate court as a holographic
will.32 The other Fountain siblings vehemently objected to the will because
they thought the will was not in Mrs. Fountain's handwriting.33 The matter
went to trial in circuit court.34
At the trial handwriting experts testified about the authenticity of the
will.35 The trial court also heard testimony from Mrs. Verlin Harris, Mrs.
25. Id. at 4.
26. Id.
27. Appellee's Supplemental Abstract and Brief at 4, Edmondston (No. CA 02-842).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Appellant's Abstract and Brief at 15, Edmondston (No. CA 02-842).
31. See id.
32. Appellee's Supplemental Abstract and Brief at 5, Edmondston (No. CA 02-842).
33. Appellant's Abstract and Brief at 8, Edmondston (No. CA 02-842).
34. Id.
35. Id. The court examined literally "hundreds" of writing samples from the late Mrs.
Fountain. Id.
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Fountain's 85-year-old sister.36 Mrs. Harris testified that she spoke fre-
quently with Mrs. Fountain and that in a conversation during the month of
Mrs. Fountain's death, they spoke about wills. 37 Twice in that conversation,
Mrs. Fountain stated she had a will.38 Mrs. Harris exhorted Mrs. Fountain to
have two attesting witnesses sign the will, but Mrs. Fountain responded that
she already had two witnesses.39
The two attesting witnesses for Mrs. Fountain's -will -were Mr. Ricki
Smithson and Mr. Justin McAlister.40 Smithson was a long-time acquaint-
ance of Mrs. Fountain's. 41 McAlister was not acquainted with Mrs. Fountain
but happened to accompany Smithson on the day Mrs. Fountain asked them
to sign the instrument. 2 On that day, Smithson and McAlister were in
search of Brad Edmonston.43 The two men saw Mrs. Fountain on her front
porch and stopped to ask if Mrs. Fountain knew where to find Brad.44 After
some conversation, Mrs. Fountain asked the men to do her a favor.45 She
went into her house and returned with the purported holographic instru-
ment.46 Mrs. Fountain asked the men to witness the paper.47 Smithson and
McAlister signed the document for Mrs. Fountain.48 In their depositions,
both Smithson and McAlister stated that they thought the instrument was a
will.
49
After hearing the evidence, the trial court ruled that the instrument was
both written and signed by Mrs. Fountain. 50 Following that determination,
the trial court considered whether the instrument was a will.51 In its analysis
of whether the instrument was a will, the only issue the trial court consid-
ered was if the instrument had "language ... sufficient in testamentary
36. Id. at 5.
37. Id. The two sisters spoke for about an hour almost every night. Id.
38. Id.
39. Appellant's Abstract and Brief at 5, Edmonston (No. CA 02-842).
40. Id. at 5-7.
41. Id. at 6. Mrs. Fountain was probably a babysitter for Mr. Smithson at some point in
his youth, evidenced by Smithson's referral to Fountain as "Granny," his statement that he
knew her since he was four or five, and his statement that Fountain "used to spank (his] hind
end." Id.
42. See id. at 7.
43. Id. at 6. Brad's parents were Chick and Kay Edmonston. Id.
44. Id. at 6. There were two houses on Mrs. Fountain's farm. Id. Mrs. Fountain lived in
one, and the Edmonstons lived in the other. Id.




49. Id. at 6-7.
50. Id. at 6.
51. Appellant's Abstract and Brief at 16, Edmonston (No. CA 02-842).
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character., 52 The trial court stated that the determination of the language's
character was a question of law for the court to decide from the face of the
writing.53
The trial court applied its rule by comparing Mrs. Fountain's purported
will to the will in Estate of O'Donnell.54 Both the Fountain will and the will
in O'Donnell were similar because they were lists of names and property
with the caption "Last Will."55 The trial court did not expound on the rea-
soning of O'Donnell.56 Instead, the trial court seized on the holding in
0 'Donnell that the O 'Donnell will had no testamentary character. 57 Because
the two wills were similar in both form and substance, the trial court rea-
soned that the Fountain will also lacked testamentary language.
58
Even though there was extrinsic evidence from Mrs. Harris, Mr. McAl-
ister, and Mr. Smithson, the trial court did not consider the extrinsic evi-
dence because Mrs. Fountain's writing lacked the "intent to make a will"
due to lack of testamentary language and, therefore, "extrinsic evidence
[was] not admissible to prove the necessary intent., 59 The trial court refused
to probate Mrs. Fountain's alleged will and dismissed the proceeding.
60
A. The Arkansas Court of Appeals's Decision
Kay Edmonston appealed the trial court's decision to the Arkansas
Court of Appeals.61 On appeal, Mrs. Edmonston argued that her mother
unequivocally intended the handwritten instrument as a will and that the
words contained within the four comers of the will were not the deciding
factor for whether her mother intended the document as a will. 62 The admin-
istrator-siblings defended their contention that the law required "words of a
testamentary nature" for a holographic will to be valid and that Mrs. Foun-
tain's purported will contained no such words.
63
Seizing upon Mrs. Edmonston's argument, the court stated that the law
in Arkansas was that "the intent of the maker is the primary consideration in
determining the validity of a will." 64 The court acknowledged that a valid
52. Id. (quoting Ardent v. Ardent, 80 Ark. 204, 96 S.W. 982 (1906)).
53. Id. at 17 (citing Cartwright v. Cartwright, 158 Ark. 278, 250 S.W. 11 (1923)).
54. 304 Ark. 460, 803 S.W.2d 530 (1991).
55. See Appellant's Abstract and Brief at 17, Edmondston (No. CA 02-842).
56. Id. at 17.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. Id. at 18 (quoting McDonald v, Petty, 262 Ark. 517, 559 S.W.2d 1 (1977)).
60. Id.
61. Edmondston, 84 Ark. App. at 232, 137 S.W.3d at 415 (2003).
62. Id. at 234, 137 S.W.3d at 416.
63. Id. at 235, 137 S.W.3d at 417.
64. Id. at234, 137 S.W.3d at 416.
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holographic will must disclose the intention of the maker,65 but it refused,
however, to recognize any limits on the form of a will or on how decedents
choose to express testamentary intention. 66 The court also noted that extrin-
sic evidence was "customarily" admitted by Arkansas courts to prove tes-
67tamentary intent.
In the court's opinion, the only issue to decide was "whether words of
a testamentary nature are absolutely required ... for the instrument to be
admitted for probate. 68 Mrs. Edmonston contended that the trial court's
authorities were factually distinguishable, and that the trial court's authori-
ties did not stand for the proposition that the words on the face of the will
were of greater importance than the intent of the decedent "as evidenced by
the instrument itself and the admitted extrinsic evidence. 69
Agreeing with Mrs. Edmonston, the court set about its distinction of
the trial court's authorities. 70 First, the court considered Dunn v. Means71 as
precedent for the administrator-siblings argument.72 According to the court,
the holding of Dunn was not that the instrument in Dunn was totally devoid
of testamentary words, but instead was that the instrument's words did not
evidence testamentary intent.7 3 The court noted that two full sentences in the
Dunn will were a possible directive for the disposition of property after
death.74
Continuing its distinction, the court struck farther into the heart of
Dunn by distinguishing McDonald v. Petty [hereinafter McDonald 11], the
keystone authority in Dunn.76 In McDonald 11, the Arkansas Supreme Court
stated that the will in that case had "no words of a dispositive nature" and
65. Id., 137 S.W.3d at 417. The court stated that "[t]estamentary intent is necessary to
the validity of a holographic will." Id., 137 S.W.3d at 417 (citing Chambers v. Younes, 240
Ark. 428,430, 399 S.W.2d 655, 657 (1966)).
66. See id., 137 S.W.3d at 417. The court declared "that a valid will may take many
forms" and that when evaluating testamentary language "[n]o particular words.., are neces-
sary."Id, 137 S.W.3d at 417 (citing Chambers, 240 Ark. at 430-32, 399 S.W.2d at 657).
67. Edmondston, 84 Ark. App. at 234, 137 S.W.3d at 417 (citing Chambers, 240 Ark. at
430-31,399 S.W.2d at 657).
68. Id. at 235, 137 S.W.3d at 417.
69. Id., 137 S.W.3d at 417.
70. Id., 137 S.W.3d at 417.
71. 304 Ark. 473, 803 S.W.2d 521 (1991).
72. Edmondston, 84 Ark. App. at 235-36, 137 S.W.3d at 417-18.
73. See id. at 236, 137 S.W.3d at 418 (discussing Dunn, 304 Ark. 473, 803 S.W.2d 542
(1991)).
74. Id., 137 S.W.3d at 418 (discussing Dunn, 304 Ark. 473, 803 S.W.2d 521 (1991)).
The two sentences the court referred to were "Judee Dunn-Claude & I give you full power to
do & take care of all our Business & do as you wish with, with it, [sic] with no problems
from anyone." Id., 137 S.W.3d at 417 (quoting Dunn, 304 Ark. at 474, 803 S.W.2d at 542).
75. 262 Ark. 517, 559 S.W.2d 1 (1977) [hereinafter McDonald II].
76. Edmondston, 84 Ark. App. at 236, 137 S.W.3d at 418.
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was "defective on its face because it lacked the required ... intent to make a
will."' 77 Because the document failed to show testamentary intent, the
McDonald II court barred the admission of extrinsic evidence to prove the
document was a will. 78 To distinguish McDonald II, the appeals court cited
the unintelligible nature of the will in McDonald 11.79 The appeals court
noted that with regard to the McDonald H instrument, the Arkansas Su-
preme Court observed that the instrument was "merely a sketch or drawing
on the back of an envelope with names in individual squares" and that there
was "absolutely nothing" in the instrument evidencing an intent dispose of
property after death.80 The appeals court contrasted Mrs. Fountain's will
with the McDonald II will and concluded that Mrs. Fountain's will was
completely different from the McDonald H will because of the apparent
degree of care taken by Mrs. Fountain to prepare the will and because of the
caption "Last Will" at the top the Fountain will.81
Next, the appeals court distinguished O 'Donnell, the second authority
used by the trial court8 2 Like the trial court, the appeals court recognized
the similarities between the O'Donnell will and the Fountain will.8 3 Unlike
the trial court, the appeals court articulated the reasoning process in
O'Donnell that considered the language on the face of the holographic in-
strument in conjunction with extrinsic evidence. 84 The appeals court con-
cluded that O'Donnell did not stand for lack of testamentary language as
being "fatal to a holographic will on the issue of testamentary 
intent."85
Because the court felt that the two authorities used by the trial court
were not a sufficient basis to keep Mrs. Fountain's will out of probate or
exclude extrinsic evidence to prove Mrs. Fountain's intent, the court re-
versed the decision of the trial court and remanded with instructions to ad-
mit the will to probate.8 6
III. BACKGROUND
While there are formal will statutes in every state, the holographic will
persists by statute in about one half of the states as an alternative to a formal
77. Id. at 236, 137 S.W.3d at 418 (quoting McDonaldlI, 262 Ark. at 518, 559 S.W.2d at
1).
78. Id. at 236, 137 S.W.3d at 418 (discussing McDonald II, 262 Ark. at 518, 559
S.W.2d at 1).
79. See id., 137 S.W.3d at 418.
80. Id., 137 S.W.3d at 418 (quoting McDonaldII, 262 Ark. at 519, 559 S.W.2d at 2).
81. Id., 137 S.W.3d at 418.
82. Id. at 236-38, 137 S.W.3d at 418-19.
83. Edmondston, 84 Ark. App. at 236, 137 S.W.3d at 418.
84. Id. at 236-38, 137 S.W.3d at 418-19.
85. Id. at 238, 137 S.W.3d at 419.
86. Id., 137 S.W.3d at 419.
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will.87 Two major rationales for recognizing such an informal vehicle of
inheritance are to decrease intestacy 88 and to support the individual's testa-
mentary freedom.89 This section will trace the historical roots of this prac-
tice, 90 lay the foundation of Arkansas law regarding holographic wills and
testamentary intent,91 and then examine the Arkansas court's positions on
proof of testamentary intent.92
A. Historical Development of Holographic Wills
Unfortunately, the exact origins of the holographic will are unclear.
93
The Romans, however, were the first to codify holographic wills in the
western world.94 Near the end of the Roman Empire, the provincial Ger-
manic kings of Italy, France, and Spain adopted compilations of laws for
their Roman subjects.95 One such compilation was Lex Visigothorum, a set
of laws written by the Visigoths in the seventh century.96 The Lex Visi-
gothorum had a provision for holographic wills that allowed one to will
away property with a handwritten instrument that included the date and
one's signature.97 In the twelfth century, the nobility phased out the codes of
the Germanic kings, and replaced the codes with the code of Justinian.98
Holographic wills disappeared from the law during this period, but later
reappeared in the municipal laws of France in the fifteenth century.99 In the
sixteenth century, the holographic will 'appeared in the ecclesiastical courts
of England00 and remained effective until abolished by statute. °10
87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.2
cmt. a (1998).
88. Lawrence H. Averill Jr. & Ellen B. Brantley, A Comparison of Arkansas 's Current
Law Concerning Sucession, Wills, and Other Donative Transfers with Article II of the 1990
Probate Code, 17 U. ARK. LITTLE RocK L.J. 631, 661-62 (1995).
89. Gail Boreman Bird, Sleight of Handwriting: The Holographic Will in California, 32
HASTINGS L.J. 605, 610 (1981).
90. See infra Section III.A.
91. See infra Section IlI.B.
92. See infra Sections III.C.1, III.C.2, and III.C.3.
93. R.H. Helmholz, The Origin of Holographic Wills in English Law, 15 J. LEGAL
HISTORY 97, 97 (1994).
94. Reginald Parker, History of the Holograph Testament in Civil Law, 3 JURIST 1, 2
(1943). The Romans allowed "privileged testaments" in times of plague, for peasants, for
soldiers, and from father to his heirs. Id
95. Id. at 6.
96. Id. at 7.
97. Id. at 7-8.
98. id. at 10.
99. See id. at 10-18. Professor Parker argues the re-introduction of the holographic will
into the laws of France was not from the Roman or Visigoth laws but from the customs of the
local peoples. Id. at 15.
100. See Helmholz, supra note 93, at 98-99. Professor Helmholz demonstrates the holo-
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In America, the first codification of holographic wills appeared in Lou-
isiana and Virginia.10 2 During the first legislative session after statehood in
1838, Arkansas adopted the holographic will. 10 3 The present Arkansas code
still allows holographic wills into probate when the will is in the handwrit-
ing of the testator, and in the event no witnesses sign the will, at least three
"credible disinterested witnesses" verify the handwriting of the deceased.'04
B. Early Arkansas Case Law and the Development of the Testamentary
Intent Requirement
The informal nature of the holographic will allows most any handwrit-
ten instrument in which the testator describes the disposition of property
after death to qualify as a holographic will. 0 5 For example, a widow suc-
cessfully submitted the suicide note of her late husband as a holographic
will in Ardent v. Ardent.'0 6 The note, written entirely in the hand of the hus-
band on the day of his death and found on his dresser, read in part: "Dear
Wife: You will find everything all right, I hope. Whatever I have in worldly
goods, it is my wish that you should possess them."'0 7 The court had little
concern for the irregular form and informal language of the will and cited
several cases from other jurisdictions where the courts held that personal
correspondence qualified as a valid holographic will.
08
graphic will in England was an innovation of the English Church that arose from the privi-
leged will available to soldiers under Roman law.
101. Id. at 99. In 1667, the Statute of Frauds invalidated the use of holographic instru-
nments to transfer real property. Id. at 97. Parliament banned the use of holographic instru-
ments with regard to personal property in 1837. Id.
102. Bird, supra note 89, at 606. Louisiana recognized the holographic will in 1808,
Virginia in 1819. Id
103. 157 REv. STAT. ARK. § 4 (Weeks, Jordan & Co 1838). The original Arkansas holo-
graphic will provision reads: "[W]here the entire body of the will and the signature thereto,
shall be written in the proper handwriting of the testator or testatrix, notwithstanding there
may be no attesting witnesses to such will." Id
104. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-104 (LEXIS Repl. 2004).
105. Stanley R. Langley, Note, Proof of Testamentary Intent in Holographic Codicils, 25
ARK. L. REv. 376, 376 (1971).
106. 80 Ark. 204, 96 S.W. 982 (1906). The court did not elaborate on the circumstances
of Mr. Ardent's suicide only that it was "for what seems a trifling cause." Id at 208, 96 S.W.
at 983.
107. Id at 204, 96 S.W. at 982.
108. Id at 207-08, 96 S.W. at 982-83. The court discussed two cases from North Caro-
lina and a case from California. Id., 96 S.W. at 982-83; see also Clarke v. Ransom, 50 Cal.
595, (1875) (handwritten note from dying woman to friend was valid holographic will);
Outlaw v. Hurdle, 46 N.C. 150 (1853) (short handwritten statement by ill man stating he
wanted his property to go to his friend was a holographic will); Alston v. Davis, 24 S.E. 15
(N.C. 1896) (letter from man missing and presumed dead held to be valid holographic will).
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Because it is possible that any handwritten personal correspondence
that mentions the disposition of property after death is a holographic will,
the Arkansas courts ascertain whether the decedent intended the document
to be a will.109 The intention to make a document a will is animus testandi,
or testamentary intent.110 In Ardent, the court held that the late Mr. Ardent
wrote his suicide note with the requisite intent because Mr. Ardent was
"sincerely attached to his wife" and "the language of his letter to her, writ-
ten under the shadow of impending death, shows ... that it was testamen-
tary in character.""'
In Cartwright v. Cartwright,'1 2 the court evaluated a love letter from an
Arkansan serving in France during World War I to his wife as a holographic
testament. 13 The court sifted through the soldier's descriptions of life over-
seas and endearments to his wife and considered whether the following lan-
guage was testamentary:
I think I can get an allotment made soon. You will get $15 of my pay
and $15 from the government made soon. You will get $15 of my pay
and $15 from the government, then I will get $4.75 per mo. We both
will draw $45 a mo. then I have to pay insurance & Liberty bonds out of
my part, then you will get the $5,000 when I die, so you should not want
for anything except me. (Signed) "Lus." 114
In addition to the purported testamentary language, the court observed
that the soldier also contemplated his mortality in the letter.' 15 The court
addressed the question of the testamentary character of the letter as "one of
law for the court to determine from the face of the offered instrument."" 
6
The court elaborated that an instrument which "purports to bequeath or de-
vise any property, either in general or particular terms, to an individual or
class of individuals ... is of testamentary character." ' 1 7 The court upheld
the letter as a will because the soldier manifested intent to leave the $5,000
life insurance policy to his wife upon his death. 1
8
Seventeen years later, the Arkansas Supreme Court again confronted
the question of whether or not an informal writing expressed testamentary
109. Stark v. Stark, 201 Ark. 133, 138, 143 S.W.2d 875, 877-78 (1940). Testamentary
intent is "the intention to make a will." Id., 143 S.W.2d 875, 877-78.
110. Id., 143 S.W.2d 875, 877-78.
111. Ardent, 80 Ark. 204, 96 S.W. 982 (1906).
112. 158 Ark. 278, 250 S.W. 11(1923).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 281, 250 S.W. at 12.
115. Id., 250 S.W. at 12.
116. Id. at 223-83, 250 S.W. at 13.
117. id. at284, 250 S.W. at 13.
118. Id., 250 S.W. at 13.
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intent in Stark v. Stark."19 After Mr. Stark's sudden death in 1933, his son
120
and widow discovered Mr. Stark's will in a rolltop desk at the Stark family
home.' 2' The will, executed in 1922 prior to Mr. Stark's second marriage,
122left the entire estate to the son. 2 On the front of the will, however, Mr.
Stark wrote in his own handwriting "cancelled" along with the date and his
signature. 23 Mr. Stark also cut away the signature at the bottom of the will,
and on the back of the will, he wrote out the following:
Apr. 1, 1930
At this time I have no Will believing My Wife-Will of my personal Es-
tate give my Son such as he may choose of the same-there is barely
sufficient to maintain her with no other beneficiary. Should my son Win.
P. Stark meet with reverses I feel the relation between Hazel and him are
such as would justify each others Confidence.
(Signed) Win. A. Stark.
124
After they sought the advice of an attorney, the widow and son entered
into a settlement agreement the same year. 1 5 In 1939, Mrs. Stark probated
the writing from the back of the mutilated formal will as a separate holo-
graphic will. 2 6 The court noted that the writing began with "At this time I
have no will," and that Mr. Stark needed to only copy the testamentary lan-
guage from the front of the will to make a new will on the back of the
document. 27 The court cited Ardent with approval and stated that only
documents executed with testamentary intent were valid wills.128 The court
declared the boundary of testamentary intent to exist "not as a matter of
inference, but ... expressed so that no mistake be made" about the exis-
tence of the intent. 2 9 After it expressed concern for the writing's failure to
devise Stark's real estate, the court refused to overturn the denial of probate
for the writing.'
30
119. 201 Ark. 133, 143 S.W.2d 875 (1940).
120. Mr. Stark's son, William P. Stark, was a child from a prior marriage and not the son
of Hazel A. Stark, the widow in this case. Id. at 134, 143 S.W.2d at 876.
121. Id. at 135, 143 S.W.2d at 876.
122. Id., 143 S.W.2d at 876.
123. Id, 143 S.W.2d at 876.
124. Id., 143 S.W.2d at 876.
125. Stark, 201 Ark. at 135-36, 143 S.W.2d at 876-77.
126. Id. at 136, 143 S.W.2d at 876. The court noted that Mrs. Stark probated the will
after "the son's wife filed a foreclosure suit against the widow growing oat of another en-
tirely different transaction." Id., 143 S.W.2d at 876.
127. Id., 143 S.W.2d at 876.
128. Id. at 138, 143 S.W.2d at 877-78.
129. Id., 143 S.W.2d at 877-78.
130. Id., 143 S.W.2d at 877-78.
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These early Arkansas cases recognized the informal nature of the holo-
graphic will, but the courts in these cases also set limits on what constituted
an acceptable holographic will. In addition to meeting the statutory mini-
mums, the courts also required the maker of the document to execute it with
testamentary intent. One important issue unresolved by the early case law is
how the proponent of a holographic will can prove testamentary intent. Sec-
tion III.C below explains the law regarding proof of testamentary intent in
holographic wills.
C. Proof of Testamentary Intent
With the basic foundation of Arkansas's law concerning testamentary
intent in holographic instruments set out above, the focus of this subsection
is on proving that a holographic instrument was executed with testamentary
intent. The Arkansas Supreme Court has two positions on the matter. The
first is that it is appropriate to prove testamentary intent with extrinsic evi-
dence regardless of the language of the document.' 3' The second position is
that extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove testamentary intent unless
the document has dispositive language expressing that intent. 32 The latter
of these positions seems to be the present law, but the Arkansas Supreme
Court left ambiguity in the law as to whether the former position is no
longer a permissible legal framework.
33
1. Extrinsic Evidence Admitted to Prove Testamentary Intent
In 1966 the Arkansas Supreme Court allowed extrinsic evidence to
prove testamentary intent in a holographic will proceeding. 134 Mr. Boyd
Ruff died after suffering from a serious coronary condition.135 His widow,
Mrs. Modene Ruff, discovered a blank check in Mr. Ruff s wallet. 36 On the
back of the check, Mr. Ruff wrote and signed the following message: "I
Boyd Ruff request that all I own in the way of personal or real estate prop-
erty to be [sic] my wife Modene."'13 Mr. Ruffs sister, Lois Chambers, chal-
lenged the will but lost at the trial level because the trial court allowed ex-
trinsic evidence to prove testamentary intent.'
38
131. See infra Section III.C. 1.
132. See infra Section III.C.2.
133. See infra Section III.C.3.
134. Chambers v. Younes, 240 Ark. 428, 399 S.W.2d 655 (1966).
135. Id. at 432, 399 S.W.2d at 657.
136. Id. at 428, 399 S.W.2d at 656.
137. Id. at 429, 399 S.W.2d at 656.
138. Id. at 428-29, 399 S.W.2d at 656.
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On review the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the admission of ex-
trinsic evidence.' 39 Specifically, the court endorsed "inquiry . . . into all
relevant circumstances where the existence of testamentary intent is in
doubt."' 140 The court also ruled that because the law permitted the use of
extrinsic evidence when testamentary intent was in doubt, there was no re-
quirement for testamentary language on the face of a purported holographic
will.'4 ' Given the extrinsic evidence that Mr. Ruff had a serious coronary
condition, suffered a heart attack shortly before he executed the will, and
shared a close relationship with his wife, the court upheld the validity of the
will.'
42
2. A "Petty" Dispute Leads to an Important Rule: Extrinsic Evi-
dence Allowed Only if the Will Contains Dispositive Words
Confronted with a document that consisted of a "drawing on the back
of a used envelope with names in individual squares, directions indicated,
and the decedent's signature and date," the Arkansas Supreme Court refused
to probate the document as a holographic will because the will lacked words
of disposition. 43 This case, however, did not begin as a dispute over a holo-
graphic will. The original controversy began when Mr. Frank Petty and his
five siblings each acquired a one sixth interest in their father's ninety-five-
acre farm. 44 One of the siblings, Ray Petty, commenced an action against
his siblings to partition the farm.' 45 The county court subsequently declared
it impossible to satisfactorily partition the land and ordered a public sale.
46
In the time leading up to the sale, Frank Petty allegedly threatened his sib-
lings with violence if they did not convey their interests in the farm to
him.147 Frank attained each of his siblings' interests in the farm for a con-
sideration of $3,000 and a promise to convey the farm back to his siblings in
his will.' 48 On the day of the partition sale, two of Frank's siblings success-
139. Id at 430, 399 S.W.2d at 657.
140. Chambers, 240 Ark. at 430, 399 S.W.2d at 657 (quoting the former 94 C.J.S. Wills §
203 emphasis added by the court, now 95 C.J.S Wills § 203 (2001)).
141. Id. at 432, 399 S.W.2d at 658.
142. ld, 399 S.W.2d at 658.
143. McDonaldll, 262 Ark. 517, 519 559 S.W.2d 1, 2 (1977).
144. McDonald v. Petty, 254 Ark. 705, 496 S.W.2d 365 (1973) [hereinafter McDonald 1].
145. Id. at 707, 496 S.W.2d at 366.
t46. Id., 496 S.W.2d at 366.
147. Id. at 706-07, 496 S.W.2d at 366. The Petty siblings accused their brother of threat-
eiiing to kill them or anyone else who attempted to bid on the property at the public sale. Id,
496 S.W.2d at 366. Ray Petty alleged that Frank personally threatened him with a pistol. Id,
496 S.W.2d at 366.
148. Id. at 706, 496 S.W.2d at 366.
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frilly petitioned the county court to stop the sale because Frank had com-
plete interest in the property.
49
Eight years later, Frank died intestate whereupon the surviving siblings
instituted an action to enforce their claim that Frank made an oral contract
to will the property back to them.150 After losing in the court below, the
estate of Frank's widow, Mrs. Hazel Petty, appealed to the Arkansas Su-
preme Court.' 51 The court refused to recognize the oral contract to make a
will for a myriad of reasons. 152 First, the total consideration paid by Frank
was more than the market value of the property.153 Second, no disinterested
witness testified that Frank either threatened any of his siblings or had a
propensity for violence.' 54 Finally, there was no evidence that the siblings
were upset or in disagreement about the disposition of the property.
55
During the proceedings over the oral contract to make a will, one of the
Petty siblings discovered a document that was seemingly Frank Petty's
will. 56 The Petty siblings submitted the document to probate in a separate
proceeding and won in part because the court allowed extrinsic evidence to
prove testamentary intent. 157 The document, written on the back of a used
envelope, entailed a series of squares with "directions indicated,"'58 Frank
Petty's signature, and the date. 159 In a short opinion, the court disallowed
the document as a holographic will because the document had "no words of
a dispositive nature" and therefore lacked testamentary intent.' 60 The court
reasoned that because there was no testamentary intent on the face of the
document, extrinsic evidence was not admissible to prove testamentary in-
tent. 16 1 The court distinguished Chambers by stating that the review of cases
149. Id. at 708, 496 S.W.2d at 367.
150. McDonald1, 254 Ark. at 705,496 S.W.2d at 365.
151. Id. at 706, 496 S.W.2d at 365. Hazel suffered from cancer during the trial, and about
a year afterwards, she died. Id. at 709, 496 S.W.2d at 367.
152. See id. at 708-10, 496 S.W.2d at 367-68.
153. A professional appraiser valued the property at $17,862.00, but Frank paid his sib-
lings a total $20,125.93, which included Frank's interest, the $3,000.00 interest of each of his
siblings, the attorney's fees of $450.00 from Ray's partition action, and the assumption of a
loan against the land totaling $1,675.93 by Frank. Id. at 708-09, 496 S.W.2d at 367.
154. Id. at 709, 496 S.W.2d at 367-68.
155. Id at 709, 496 S.W.2d at 367.
156. McDonaldI, 262 Ark. at 517, 559 S.W.2d at 1.
157. Id. at 518, 559 S.W.2d at 1.
158. The court did not articulate what it meant by "directions indicated," but if one exam-
ines the original holographic instrument, the logical impression is that the court meant that
each square on the holographic instrument had the name of a Petty sibling in it. See id at
519, 559 S.W.2d at 2.
159. Id. at 519, 559 S.W.2d at 2.
160. Id. at 518, 559 S.W.2d at 1.
161. Id., 559 S.W.2d at 1.
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in Chambers 162 "recognized that the words in a holographic instrument must
indicate a testamentary intent.,
163
3. A Return to Extrinsic Evidence Without Dispositive Words?
The bar to extrinsic evidence for wills without "dispositive" words re-
mained in full effect for over a decade). The Arkansas Supreme Court,
however, appeared to revert to the use of extrinsic evidence without consid-
ering the language on the face of the document in the 1991 case of Estate of
O'Donnell.65 The family 166 of Harold O'Donnell attempted to probate a
holographic instrument that O'Donnell wrote in 1988.167 Evidence showed
that O'Donnell prepared the instrument at the direction of his attorney in
order to "tide him [O'Donnell] over" while the attorney prepared a formal
will. 168 When O'Donnell completed his holographic will, he delivered it to
his attorney's office, handed it to his attorney, and said "here it is.' 16 9 The
will consisted of a list of O'Donnell's beneficiaries and the portion of the
estate for each, the words "last will and test," and O'Donnell's signature.1
70
In its determination that the writing was not a valid holographic will, the
probate court did not merely look at the face of the document but instead
used a factors test that included both evidence from the face of the docu-
ment and extrinsic evidence.' 7 ' In a memorandum opinion, the probate court
listed seven factors 172 as favoring the instrument as a will, and eleven fac-
162. The court did not provide a pinpoint cite to identify the review of cases to which the
court refers. See McDonaldII, 262 Ark. at 519, 559 S.W.2d at 2.
163. Id., 559 S.W.2d at 2.
164. See David Terrell Faith Prophet Ministries v. Estate of Varnum, 284 Ark. 108, 112,
681 S.W.2d 310, 312 (1984) (citing McDonald H for the use of extrinsic evidence only when
the document expresses testamentary intent); see also Faith v. Singleton, 2S6 Ak. 41)3, 4V5,
692 S.W.2d 239, 242 (1985) (citing McDonald H to mean that courts look to the "four cor-
ners of the instrument" for testamentary intent).
165. 304 Ark. 460, 803 S.W.2d 530 (1991).
166. Harold O'Donnell's family in this case was his two brothers and his mother. Id. at
461, 803 S.W.2d at 530. Harold's widow, Patricia O'Donnell, opposed the instrument. Id.,
803 S.W.2d at 530.
167. Id. at 461, 803 S.W.2d at 530. While not successful in their bid to probate the hand-
written will, O'Donnell's family successfully overturned the probate court's award of debt-
free dower to Patricia with their argument that Harold's typewritten formal will of 1979 was
still in effect. Id. at 465-66, 803 S.W.2d at 532-33. Harold ordered his attorney to tear the
will in half, but the attorney did not do so in Harold's presence as per the formal statutory
requirements. Id., 803 S.W.2d at 532-33.
168. Id. at 464, 803 S.W.2d at 532.
169. Id., 803 S.W.2d at 532.
170. Id. at 467, 803 S.W.2d at 533.
171. O'Donnell, 304 Ark. at 462-64, 803 S.W.2d at 531-32.
172. The probate court considered the following factors to favor the instrument as a will:
decedent's delivery of the instrument to attorney and statement to attorney "here it is," the
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tors173 disfavoring the instrument as a will. 174 The Arkansas Supreme Court
reviewed the probate court's opinion and concluded that the probate court's
approach was "within the framework of the applicable law."' 75
Only one week after issuing the O'Donnell opinion, the Arkansas Su-
preme Court appeared to revert to disallowing extrinsic evidence to prove
testamentary intent in Dunn v. Means.176 The deceased in Dunn was Mr.
Claude Rogers, a man who lived with his female traveling companion, Ms.
Maxine Robertson.177 The two owned a house together, but were not mar-
ried. 178 Ms. Robertson and Mr. Rogers invited Ms. Robertson's only daugh-
ter, the daughter's husband, and a close mutual friend to dinner one evening
before Robertson and Rogers were to take an extended vacation.
79
While all were present that evening, Ms. Robertson drafted a three-
page holographic will and signed her name at the end.' 80 After her signature,
Ms. Robertson added a second, independent writing from her original will:
"Judee Dunn Claude & I give you full power to do & take care of all our
Business & do as you wish with it, with it, [sic] with no problems from
anyone. You can sell or dispose of all property & monies.' 181 This writing
was not in Mr. Rogers' handwriting, but Mr. Rogers and Ms. Robertson
signed below the end of the writing. 182 Both Ms. Robertson's son-in-law
and the mutual friend witnessed the second writing.'83
Mr. Claude Rogers died two months later, and his brother Virgil
Rogers, who thought Claude died intestate, petitioned for Mr. Henry Means
decedent's taciturn personality, the instrument being both signed and dated, the "Last Will
and Testament" caption at the top of the instrument, the widow not knowing about a prior
will, the widow not knowing about the revocation of the prior will, and the decedent's not
telling his wife their house was in only his name. Id. at 463, 803 S.W.2d at 531.
173. The probate court's factors disfavoring the instrument as a will were brevity of the
document, the use of both pen and pencil on scratch paper, strikeovers made by decedent, the
lack of urgency to have a will, failure of document to dispose of all property, decedent's
attorney called the document a list, decedent wanted his attorney to make a formal will,
decedent showed draft of formal will to wife and did not tell her about the handwritten will,
decedent went over the draft of the formal will with his wife, handwritten will had no words
of a dispositive nature, and the handwritten will did not mention the wife. Id., 803 S.W.2d at
532.
174. Id. at 462-64, 803 S.W.2d at 531-32.
175. Id. at 465, 803 S.W.2d at 532.
176. 304 Ark. 473, 803 S.W.2d 542 (1991).
177. Id. at 474, 803 S.W.2d at 542.
178. Id., 803 S.W.2d at 542.
179. Id., 803 S.W.2d at 542.
180. Id., 803 S.W.2d at 542. It is unclear from the Dunn opinion as to what Ms. Robert-
son wrote on the first three pages of the will. See id.
181. Id., 803 S.W.2d at 542-43.
182. Dunn, 304 Ark. at 474, 803 S.W.2d at 542-43.
183. Id., 803 S.W.2d at 542-43.
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III to be the administrator of Claude Rogers's estate. 184 About eight weeks
later, Judee Dunn filed the second writing with the probate court as the will
of Claude Rogers. 185 After the probate court refused to probate the writing,
Judee Dunn appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court.
186
On appeal, Mrs. Dunn argued that the probate court erred by not con-
sidering extrinsic evidence to prove Mr. Rogers's testamentary intent.
187
The court cited McDonald II with approval, stating that a holographic will
needs "words of a dispositive nature" on its face in order to be a will exe-
cuted with testamentary intent. 88 With regard to Mr. Rogers, the court
found "no testamentary intent whatsoever" in the testamentary clause of the
will. 189
By taking opposite approaches in two cases within a week of one an-
other, the Arkansas Supreme Court left an ambiguity in the law for proof of
testamentary intent. This ambiguity was whether courts were to follow the
extrinsic evidence approach of Chambers v. Younes' 90 or the "four corners"
test of McDonald 11.' 9' The O'Donnell case seemed to be a manifestation of
the Chambers approach, while Dunn was a substantiation of McDonald II.
In Kay Edmonston's attempt to probate her mother's alleged holographic
will, the Arkansas Court of Appeals agreed with the reasoning set forth in
Chambers and O'Donnell, but the issue of which approach was the law ul-
timately went to the Arkansas Supreme Court for resolution.'
92
TV. REASONING
On appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court, the court, in concluding the
purported holographic will was properly denied probate, reversed the deci-
sion of the Arkansas Court of Appeals and held that holographic wills re-
quire words of disposition and that extrinsic evidence was not admissible to
184. Id. at 474, 803 S.W.2d at 543.
185. Id. at 475, 803 S.W.2d at 543. The Dunn opinion does not elaborate on whether Ms.
Dunn probated the writing as a formal or holographic will with regard to Mr. Rodgers. See
id. It appears that Ms. Dunn attempted to probate the writing as a holographic will because of
the informal nature of the instrument and the court's use of authority interpreting the law of
testamentary intent in holographic wills. See id. If this was the case, it is strange that the
court did not choose to invalidate the writing because the supposed testamentary language
was not in Mr. Rogers's handwriting-a necessity for a holographic will. See id.
186. Id., 803 S.W.2d at 543.
187. Id., 803 S.W.2d at 543.
188. Dunn, 304 Ark. at 475, 803 S.W.2d at 543.
189. Id., 803 S.W.2d at 543.
190. 240 Ark. 428, 399 S.W.2d 655 (1966).
191. 262 Ark. 517, 559 S.W.2d 1 (1977).
192. Edmundson v. Estate of Fountain, No. 03-1459, 2004 WL 1475423 (Ark. July 1,
2004).
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prove testamentary intent unless a will contains words of disposition.
93
While the Arkansas Supreme Court's ruling clarified the rules for probating
a holographic will, the ruling was also met with opposition for both substan-
tive and public policy reasons. 194 Section IV.A traces the reasoning of the
Arkansas Supreme Court majority. 19 5 Following this are sections IV.B and
IV.C, which discuss the dissents of Chief Justice Dickey and Justice Brown,
respectively. 1
96
A. The Arkansas Supreme Court Majority's Reasoning
The majority ruled upon the issue of whether the law requires a holo-
graphic will "to contain words that express a testamentary intent.' 197 The
court began with a review of the law on testamentary intent.'"
First, the court defined a will as "disposition of property to take effect
upon the death of the maker of the instrument."' 99 Second, the court recog-
nized the necessity of testamentary intent to make a document a will.
200
Next, the court limited the determination of testamentary intent to remain
within the "four comers" of the offered instrument. 20' Finally, the court
declared that the existence of testamentary intent within the document was a
question of law for the court to determine.
20 2
After laying this foundation, the court gave its interpretations of the au-
thorities relied upon or distinguished by the courts below. 20 3 The court
started with an examination McDonald v. Petty,20 4 an authority relied on by
the trial court and distinguished by the appeals court.20 5 The court empha-
sized that the rule in McDonald H was that the maker of a will must express
testamentary intent so that a reviewing court without inference cannot mis-
206
take the maker's intention. 2 6 In a reiteration of the McDonald H holding,
the court stated that all instruments without dispositive words were without
testamentary intent and therefore facially invalid.20 7 The court approved the
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See infra Section IV.A.
196. See infra Sections IV.B and IV.C, respectively.
197. Edmundson, 2004 WL 1475423.
198. See id.
199. Id. (citing Faith v. Singleton, 286 Ark. 403, 692 S.W.2d 239 (1985); Clark v. Ruth-
erford, 227 Ark. 270, 298 S.W.2d 327 (1957)).
200. Id. (citing Smith v. Nelson, 227 Ark. 512, 299 S.W.2d 645 (1957)).
201. Id. (citing McDonald v, Petty, 262 Ark. 517, 559 S.W.2d 1(1977)).
202. Id. (citixg Stark v. Starl, 20t Ark. 33,143 S.W.2d 975 (t940)1.
203. Edmundson, 2004 WL 1475423.
204. McDonald 11, 262 Ark. 517, 559 S.W.2d 1 (1977).
205. Edmundson, 2004 WL 1475423.
206. Id. (discussing McDonald 11, 262 Ark. at 519, 559 S.W.2d at 2).
207. Id.
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ruling in McDonald II that disallowed extrinsic evidence to prove testamen-
tary intent for a facially insufficient instrument.
20 8
Following its examination of McDonald II, the court scrutinized the
lower court's use of Chambers v. Younes. 209 Instead of viewing Chambers
as disregarding testamentary language for holographic wills, the court inter-
preted Chambers to require some testamentary words but no certain
words. 21° The court extended this interpretation of Chambers to limit the use
of extrinsic evidence to prove testamentary intent only when the language of
the document itself expresses testamentary intent.211 In other words, the
court ruled that the use of extrinsic evidence to prove testamentary intent in
the absence of "words of disposition" was inappropriate because "the exis-
tence of testamentary intent is not a matter of inference. 212
The court next assailed use of Estate of 0'Donnel 13 to allow extrinsic
214evidence to prove testamentary intent. The court recognized that the
O'Donnell court used extrinsic evidence to prove testamentary intent but
also noted that the O 'Donnell court did not determine if the purported will
had some testamentary words on its face.215 Also, the court criticized
O'Donnell for an incomplete citation to David Terrell Faith Prophet Minis-
tries v. Estate of Varnum. 2 6 The court stated that the O'Donnell court's
citation of Varnum did not include the language restricting the use of extrin-
sic evidence to cases where "the instrument uses words expressing testa-
mentary intent. ' ' 2 17 The court also noted that O'Donnell did not mention the
requirement from both McDonald II and Varnum that a purported will must
contain some dispositive words.218 Because O'Donnell seemed to allow the
use of extrinsic evidence to prove testamentary intent without considering
the face of the document, the court overruled O'Donnell.
219
208. Id. (quoting McDonald 11, 262 Ark. at 519-20, 559 S.W.2d at 2). Curiously, the
court followed this discussion of McDonald II with a summary of the facts and holding of
Dunn v. Means, 304 Ark. 473, 803 S.W.2d 542 (1991), but the court did not elaborate on the
significance of Dunn in its discussion. See id.
209. 240 Ark. 428, 399 S.W.2d 655 (1966).
210. Edmundson, 2004 WL 1475423 ("[T]his court recognized that while it is not neces-
sary for a testator to use specific terms such as 'bequeath' or 'devise,' there must be some




213. 304 Ark. 460, 803 S.W.2d 530 (1991).
214. Edmundson, 2004 WL 1475423.
215. Id.
216. Id. (citing David Terrell Faith Prophet Ministries v. Estate of Vamum, 284 Ark.





After giving its interpretation of O'Donnell, the court criticized the
dissenters' use of the Restatement (Third) of Property's position that extrin-
sic evidence is admissible to prove testamentary intent when there is no
testamentary intent on the face of the will. 220 The court remarked that the
Restatement was in direct conflict with the court's prior holdings and the
holding of the case at bar. 2 In one final criticism of the dissent, the court
remarked that the caption "Last Will" at the top of the Fountain will was
insufficient to "cure the defective nature of [the] document" because there
was no other language in the document that indicated Mrs. Fountain "in-
tended to give or leave certain property to each of her children.
222
Finally, the court applied its interpretation of the law to the facts of the
case.223 First, the court noted there was no language in Mrs. Fountain's will
that purported to leave property to Fountain's children.224 Second, the court
ruled that the lack of dispositive language made Mrs. Fountain's will fa-
cially defective. 225 Third, because Mrs. Fountain's will lacked testamentary
intent on its face, extrinsic evidence was not admissible to prove testamen-
226tary intent. Finally, because the "document's expressions are not so
clearly stated that, without inference, no mistake can be made that [Mrs.]
Fountain possessed the requisite testamentary intent" at the time Mrs. Foun-
tain made the will, the trial court did not commit an error for failure to ad-
mit Mrs. Fountain's will to probate.227 The court concluded that the docu-
ment was merely a list of Fountain's children with property under each
child's name. 2 8
B. The Dickey Dissent
Chief Justice Dickey dissented on the grounds that the majority's in-
terpretation of case law was inaccurate.229 She first set out to distinguish the
majority's use of Varnum, by making a more complete citation to Varnum
that included a statement that wills with no facial intent were tantamount to
220. Edmundson, 2004 WL 1475423. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS
AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.2 cmt. c (1998).






227. Edmundson, 2004 WL 1475423.
228. Id.
229. See id. (Dickey, C.J., dissenting) ("[T]he case law cited by the majority leads one to
believe that the document in question contains testamentary language sufficient to allow the
trial court to consider extrinsic evidence ....").
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the type of will in McDonald 11.230 Next, Justice Dickey made a public pol-
icy criticism of the majority for overruling O'Donnell because doing so
jeopardized the ability of citizens to draft a long-term instrument with the
expectation that courts will honor the instrument.231
Returning to her substantive law criticism of the majority, Justice
Dickey recounted the facts and reasoning of the O'Donnell case.232 After
this, Justice Dickey drew comparisons and contrasts between the O'Donnell
instrument and the Fountain will. 23 3 She recognized that both the Fountain
and O'Donnell wills were dated and signed lists with the caption "Last
Will" and that both wills had the names of beneficiaries and specific prop-
erty or cash amounts next to each name.234 A salient distinction between the
O'Donnell will and Fountain will to Justice Dickey was that the O'Donnell
will had alterations of amounts to some beneficiaries.235 Another distinction
between the two wills articulated by Justice Dickey was that the Fountain
will had two attesting witnesses.23 6 Because of the distinctions between the
Fountain and O'Donnell wills, Justice Dickey believed the case for the
Fountain will was "stronger than that in O'Donnell.' '23 7 Another criticism
leveled at the majority's logic by Justice Dickey was that if the O'Donnell
court used extrinsic evidence, then the purported will had enough testamen-
238tary language. Extending that reasoning, Justice Dickey could not recon-
cile the majority's determination that the Fountain will lacked testamentary
language when there was so much similarity between the Fountain will and
the instrument in O'Donnell.
239
To further her argument that the majority misinterpreted the law on the
admission of extrinsic evidence to prove testamentary intent, Justice Dickey
quoted the Restatement (Third) of Property's section on the probate of
holographic wills. 240 Justice Dickey noted the strong similarities between
the Restatement's example of a holographic will eligible for proof with ex-
230. Id. (Dickey, C.J., dissenting). The language Justice Dickey emphasized from Var-
num to illustrate this argument was "use of extrinsic evidence is appropriate only when the
instrument expresses an intent, it is inappropriate when the instrument expresses not intent as
in McDonald .... Id. (quoting Varnum, 284 Ark. at 112, 681 S.W.2d at 312).
231. Id. (Dickey, C.J., dissenting).("[B]oth the bar and the general public rely on our
established precedent in advising clients in the drafting of long term instruments like holo-
graphic wills. There is no reason for this court to depart from our well reasoned holding in
Estate [sic] O'Donnell ... ").
232. Id. (Dickey, C.J., dissenting).
233. Edmundson, 2004 WL 1475423 (Dickey, C.J., dissenting).





239. Edmundson, 2004 WL 1475423 (Dickey, C.J., dissenting).
240. Id.
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trinsic evidence and the Fountain will.24 1 After that, Justice Dickey quoted
the language in Chambers that appeared to allow extrinsic evidence to prove
testamentary intent.242 Justice Dickey then distinguished the will in McDon-
ald 11 from the Fountain will by contrasting the two. 2 4 3 Specifically, Justice
Dickey noted that the McDonald II will was "nothing more than a sketch on
the back of a used envelope with names in individual squares" with "abso-
lutely nothing" showing an intent to dispose of property after death while
the Fountain will listed Mrs. Fountain's children with "various property or
amounts of money after each child's name.",244 Finally, Justice Dickey ex-
amined the semantics of "dispositive words" as it related to testamentary
245 ,246language.45  Taking "dispositive" to mean "decisive factor, Justice
Dickey concluded that the caption "Last Will" and the arrangement of the
heirs' names and the property of the estate were "dispositive words. 247
241. Id. The Restatement's example was:
After G's death, a document was found in her desk. The document, written in








Two of G's friends testified that G told them that she made a will, and that it
could be found in her desk after her death. The testimony of G's friends may be
considered in determining whether G's document was executed with testamen-
tary intent .... [T]he fact that the transfers add up to all of G's estate raises an
inference of testamentary intent.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.2 cmt. c
(1998).
242. Edmundson, 2004 WL 1475423 (Dickey, C.J., dissenting). The most relevant part of
Justice Dickey's quotation of Chambers was "Review of our cases clearly indicates that our
courts have customarily admitted extrinsic testimony to establish testamentary intent ......
Id. (quoting Chambers v. Younes, 240 Ark.428,428, 399 S.W.2d 655, 655 (1966)).
243. Id. (Dickey, C.J., dissenting).
244. Id.
245. Id. (Dickey, C.J., dissenting).
246. The meaning of "dispositive" as Justice Dickey used it is "[b]cing a deciding factor;
(of a fact or factor) bringing about a final determination," but the alernate meaning is "Jof,
relating to, or reflecting the disposition of property by will or deed." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 505 (8th ed. 2004).
247. Edmundson, 2004 WL 1475423 (Dickey, C.J., dissenting). ("Because I believe the
caption 'Last Will' meets the requirement of dispositive or testamentary language on the
facts of this case, I disagree with the majority's affirmance of the trial court.").
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C. The Brown Dissent
Justice Brown dissented from the majority on the grounds that Mrs.
248Fountain's will did contain evidence of testamentary intent. Justice
Brown's dissent criticized the majority's requirement that holographic wills
have dispositive words because holographic wills require no technical or
"magic" words. 249 To Justice Brown, the majority's reasoning construed the
law so that the face of the will has to show absolute proof of testamentary
intent rather than merely raising enough testamentary intent to allow extrin-
sic evidence.250 Justice Brown also made a public policy argument against
the majority's "strict requirements" on holographic wills because such re-
strictions militate against allowing those without access to legal services to
avoid intestacy.25' Like Justice Dickey, Justice Brown also argued that
Chambers allowed extrinsic evidence to prove testamentary intent.252 As a
final criticism, Justice Brown speculated that the majority's in restricting the
availability of extrinsic evidence was to shut "the door to multiple family
squabbles in court over testamentary intent when a handwritten instrument
is found after a person's death. 253
V. SIGNIFICANCE
Before the Edmundson decision, Arkansas had two positions on the
admission of extrinsic evidence to prove testamentary intent in holographic
wills. The first position, embodied by both Chambers v. Younes 254 and Es-
tate of O'Donnell,255 had courts use all facts and circumstances to prove
testamentary intent. 6 The second position, created in McDonald v. Petty, 7
was for courts to consider extrinsic evidence to prove testamentary intent
only if the offered document was facially sufficient to the degree that one
could not mistake that the maker of the document executed the document
248. Id. (Brown, J., dissenting) ("To conclude, as the majority does, that evidence of
testamentary intent is not raised by this writing dismisses the obvious").
249. Id.
250. See id. (Brown, .J., dissenting).
251. Id. (Brown, J., dissenting).
252. Id. Justice Brown used the same language from Chambers as Justice Dickey: "[Ojur
courts have customarily admitted extrinsic evidence to establish testamentary intent . I..." d.
(quoting Chambers v. Younes, 240 Ark. 428, 428, 399 S.W.2d 655, 655 (1966)).
253. Edmundson, 2004 WL 1475423 (Brown, J. dissenting).
254. 240 Ark. 428, 399 S.W.2d 655 (1966).
255. 304 Ark. 460, 803 S.W.2d 530 (1991).
256. See discussions of Chambers, supra Section III.C. 1, and O'Donnell, supra Section
111.C.3.
257. 262 Ark. 517, 559 S.W.2d 1 (1977).
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with testamentary intent.258 Mrs. Edmonston's case was an opportunity for
the Arkansas Supreme Court to validate the approach in Chambers and
O'Donnell or to extinguish their analytical framework altogether. The result
was both a continued limitation on the use of extrinsic evidence to prove
testamentary intent259 and a great uncertainty as to the semantic require-
ments to make a valid disposition of property with a holographic wil.
260
A. The Use of Extrinsic Evidence to Prove Testamentary Intent
While Edmundson unambiguously overruled O'Donnell for consider-
ing extrinsic evidence without dispositive words, Edmundson stopped short
of overruling Chambers.261 Instead, Edmundson relied on McDonald H for
authority to distinguish Chambers.262 The holding in McDonald II also did
not overrule Chambers, but instead McDonald H distinguished Chambers
with an oblique reference to a "review of the cases [in Chambers that] rec-
ognized that the words in a holographic instrument must indicate a testa-
mentary intent.:
263
This assertion by McDonald II is suspect because McDonald II failed
to explain why the review of the cases in Chambers recognized a require-
ment for words that express a testamentary intent and because McDonald II
gave no pinpoint to the review of cases to which it referred.26 There were,
in fact, two reviews of law in Chambers.265 The first review of law in the
Chambers opinion was a quotation of 94 C.J.S Wills section 203 in which
the authors of C.J.S cite Arkansas cases in a broader discussion about tes-
tamentary intent in holographic wills. 266 The McDonald 1I court's reference
258. See discussion of McDonald I, supra Section III.C.2.
259. See infra Section V.A.
260. See infra Section V.B.
261. See Edmundson, 2004 WL 1475423.
262. Id.
263. McDonaldII, 262 Ark. at 519, 555 S.W.2d at 2.
264. See id., 555 S.W.2d at 2.
265. See Chambers, 240 Ark. 428,430-31, 399 S.W.2d 655, 657 (1966).
266. Id. at 430, 399 S.W.2d at 657 (quoting 94 C.J.S. Wills § 203, now 95 C.J.S. Wills
203 (2001)). The quotation reads as follows:
Testamentary intent is necessary to the validity of a holographic will. [Smith v.
Nelson, 227 Ark. 512, 299 S. W. 2d 645; Barnard v. Methodist Church of Mena,
Arkansas, 226 Ark. 144, 288 S. W. 2d 595.] No particular words are necessary
to manifest the animo testandi; thus, the paper need not refer to itself as a will ...
The fact that the holograplbic instrument concerns itself with matters other than
the disposition of property will not nullify its effect as a will, but it may be con-
sidered in determining the intent of the writer [Cartwright v. Cartwright, 158
Ark. 278, 250 S. W. 11] Inquiry may be made into all relevant circumstances
where the existence of testamentary intent is in doubt.' [Emphasis added)
Id., 399 S.W.2d at 657.
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to Chambers is possibly the "no particular words" language in the C.J.S
quotation. The presence of the adjective "particular" implies a limitation on
the court's willingness to consider a document without testamentary words
or with insufficient testamentary words. The second review of law in
Chambers was a cursory discussion of two cases where the courts in those
cases considered whether a decedent's personal correspondence was a valid
holographic will.267 In this review, the Chambers court stated that in those
cases extrinsic evidence "was necessary to fortify the finding of existence of
testamentary intent., 268 It is possible that this was the language to which
McDonald II referred because the infinitive phrase "to fortify" makes a
strong implication that the personal correspondence in those cases already
had some testamentary language.
Regardless of the review of law to which McDonald II referred, neither
review directly states the proposition for which McDonald II cites Cham-
bers. In fact, the ruling in Chambers was irreconcilable with that of
McDonald II because Chambers disposed of the very argument adopted by
McDonald 11.269 The Edmundson court, relying on McDonald II as author-
ity, distinguished Chambers with reasoning similar to McDonald I. 270 Even
though Chambers rejected the bar to extrinsic evidence and despite the
McDonald 1I court's dubious reference to Chambers, the interpretation of
Chambers proffered by McDonald I is now unequivocally, by way of Ed-
mundson, the law in Arkansas law governing the admission of extrinsic
evidence to prove testamentary intent for holographic wills.
267. The pertinent part of review reads:
Review of our cases clearly indicates that our courts have customarily admitted
extrinsic testimony to establish testamentary intent, without considering whether
the statute on proof of a holographic will (§ 62-2117, supra) expressly permits
such testimony. Perusal of Arendt v. Arendt, 80 Ark. 204, 96 S.W. 982, and
Weems v. Smith, 218 Ark. 554, 237 S.W.2d 880, and the letters therein held to
be valid holographic wills, it is apparent that extrinsic testimony was necessary
to fortify the finding of existence of testamentary intent. We think this is proper.
Id. at 430-31, 399 S.W.2d at 657.
268. Id., 399 S.W.2d at 657.
269. The court in Chambers considered an argument offered by the opponent of the will
in that case that a holographic will must show testamentary character and testamentary lan-
guage on its face. Id. at 432, 399 S.W.2d at 658. The court disposed of the argument because
"inquiry may be made into all relevant circumstances where the existence of testamentary
intent is in doubt." Id., 399 S.W.2d at 658.
270. Edmundson, 2004 WL 1475423.
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B. Words to Die by: What Language Must the Writer of a Holographic
Will Use to Make a Valid Disposition of Property?
The Edmundson court reaffirmed the requirement from McDonald H
that holographic wills have dispositive words. 271 Nevertheless, the court
provided little guidance on the substantive nature this requirement. By dis-
cussing the composition of the McDonald II will, the court seemingly drew
272the border for dispositive words in a holographic instrument. The
McDonald II will was literally a sketch on the back of an envelope with
some names, property, the decedent's signature, and the date. 73 After Ed-
mundson, it is almost certain that any holographic will communicated in a
visual manner will fail for lack of testamentary language.
This is the only certainty offered by the Edmundson court with regard
to the testamentary language issue. The court appeared to expand the terri-
tory of documents without words of disposition beyond visual depictions by
discussing Dunn v. Means. The alleged testamentary language in the
Dunn would read: "Judee Dunn-Claude & I give you full power to do &
take care of all our Business & do as you wish with it, with it, [sic] with no
problems from anyone.2 75 In Dunn, the court declared that the language of
the will "showed no testamentary intent whatsoever." 276 The Edmundson
court did not elaborate on the significance of the Dunn case, but the possible
legal implication is that even if a document contains verbs such as "give"
that purport to make a transfer, the court may not consider the document as
testamentary. 77 If this implication proves correct in future cases, even docu-
ments past courts considered facially sufficient could fail for lack of testa-
mentary intent.
For example, the will in Chambers was a simple writing that requested
the decedent's property "be" to his wife. 278 The verb "be" has far less testa-
mentary strength than the word "give." The word "give" implies a perma-
nent detachment from the property while the word "be" is a generic verb
with no connotation. The decedent also omitted the preposition "to" before
271. In upholding the trial court's initial determination, the Edmundson court stated that
Mrs. Fountain's will "lacked any dispositive language." Id.
272. id. (discussing McDonald 11, 262 Ark. at 519-20, 559 S.W.2d at 2).
273. See McDonald 1l, 262 Ark. at 519-20, 559 S.W.2d at 2.
274. 304 Ark. 473, 803 S.W.2d 842 (1991).
275. Id. at 474, 803 S.W.2d at 542.
276. Id. at 475, 803 S.W.2d at 543.
277. The Edmundson court made a brief summary of the facts and law in Dunn after
discussing McDonald II, but did not elaborate on the significance of Dunn. See Edmundson,
2004 WL 1475423.
278. Chambers, 240 Ark. 428, 429, 399 S.W.2d 655, 656 (1966). The instrument from
Chambers read "I Body Ruff request that all I own in the way of personal or real estate prop-
erty to be [sic] my wife Modene." Id., 399 S.W.2d at 656.
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"be" in his will.279 Surely if a post-Edmundson court considered only the
words on the face of the will in Chambers and nothing else, the will's lack
of strong words of disposition would fall into the no man's land of docu-
ments without testamentary intent.
The will of Oral Fountain seemed to fit somewhere between the
McDonald II will and the Dunn will. The Fountain will was not devoid of
words, yet there were no complete sentences with words like "bequeath" or
"devise." 280 The court recognized the "Last Will" at the top of the docu-
ment, but this was not enough to show the writer's intent that the list of
property and beneficiaries below the caption "Last Will" was a final dispo-
sition of Mrs. Fountain's estate.28'
In the wake of the Edmundson decision, a drafter of a holographic will
cannot be certain how much testamentary language or what "magic words"
the courts will require to validate a holographic will. Even though the court
recognized that holographic wills "need not have a specific title or be
couched in technically appropriate language, 282 the court's emphasis on
dispositive words created a de facto requirement for very strong testamen-
tary language to prove that the maker of a holographic will intended the
document as a will. Merely making a list of property with some visual de-
piction of which person gets what property is not enough, yet writing out
complete sentences with verbs such as "give" may also fail for lack of tes-
tamentary intent. The implications for equity are great because a will's pro-
ponent, in possession of a surfeit of evidence favoring the holographic in-
strument as a will, cannot depend on that evidence unless the purported will
is tantamount to a formal writing with strong words of disposition.
J.M Robinette*
279. Id., 399 S.W.2d at 656.
280. See Edmondston v. Estate of Fountain, 84 Ark. App. 231, 239, 137 S.W.3d 415,420
(2203), for a reproduction of the original will.
281. Edmundson, 2004 WL 1475423.
282. Id.
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